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Abstract 
Modern microfinance, a field reaching over 200 million clients worldwide, is undergoing 
considerable change.  The market structure is shifting with organizations increasingly 
accessing commercial funding through both private placements and initial public offerings.  
Some markets have overheated and produced substantial criticism, exemplified by the crisis 
in Andhra Pradesh, India.  Recent impact evaluations of microcredit in diverse countries, 
such as Bosnia, Mexico, and Morocco, are raising similar questions about what microfinance 
actually can achieve and how it can best meet the needs of the poor.  The basic offering is 
being rethought in terms of products and services, with increased attention on 
microsavings, microinsurance, and mobile banking.  The field can best be characterized as 
being in a state of flux, with institutions moving in new and, at times, contentious directions.   
This chapter is an overview of the current field of microfinance, drawing on both 
practitioner and academic resources.  Sections 1 and 2 provide a brief introduction and 
clarification of microfinance terminology.  Section 3 places microfinance in its historical 
context, reviewing predecessors such as informal community associations and state-owned 
development banks.   Section 4 describes how the modern microfinance movement began 
in the 1970s and grew to its present form.  In Section 5, the current landscape is then 
characterized in terms of scale, geographic coverage, institution size, and organizational 
type.  Sections 6 through 8 summarize the most fundamental ongoing debates in 
microfinance: the critical features of modern microfinance; the appropriate role of 
commercialization; and the assessment of microfinance's impact.  Sections 9 and 10 
conclude with implications for the broader field of social finance based on lessons learned 
from the microfinance movement to date.  Throughout the chapter, vignettes are included 
to illustrate the trends and concepts.     
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Microfinance: A Field in Flux 
1. Introduction 
Microfinance is often cited as the success story of the broader social finance movement.  
Financial access for poor and low-income clients has expanded dramatically over the last 
four decades to include over 3,500 microfinance institutions reaching over 200 million 
clients worldwide (Maes & Reed, 2012).  The approach is often viewed as a clear example of 
using market-based principles to advance a social objective, in this case primarily the use of 
unsubsidized lending to alleviate poverty (Nicholls, 2006). The movement has also 
generated extensive public acclaim, such as the United Nations recognizing 2005 as the 
International Year of Microcredit and the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarding the Peace 
Prize to Dr. Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank in 2006.   
However, to characterize the microfinance movement as an uncontested success story 
lessens our ability to understand the challenges of pioneering the social finance space.  A 
more nuanced view of microfinance reveals a field in flux faced with unresolved debates 
and ongoing changes.  The market structure is shifting, with organizations increasingly 
accessing commercial funding (Glisovic, González, Saltuk & de Mariz, 2012).  Some markets 
have overheated, producing substantial criticism (CGAP, 2010).  Recent impact evaluations 
are raising new questions about what microfinance actually can and should attempt to 
achieve (Bauchet et al, 2011; Banerjee, Karlan & Zinman, 2015).  Even the basic offering is 
being rethought in terms of products and services that will better suit the needs of the poor 
(Morduch, 2011).  Amidst these developments, the global reach of microfinance continues 
to expand (Reed et al, 2014).  In such a state of flux, it is increasingly important to 
understand both the unifying trends as well as the points of disagreement within the field.    
The intent of this chapter is to provide an overview of microfinance by exploring both its 
historical roots, as well as the significant changes that have occurred over the last decade.  
To help place microfinance in context, the chapter begins with a brief introduction to 
terminology and a review of two key historical predecessors that were particularly relevant 
to the emergence of modern microfinance: informal community associations and state-
owned development banks.  The following section describes how the modern microfinance 
movement began in the mid-1970s and grew to its present form.  The current landscape is 
then characterized in terms of scale, geographic coverage, institution size, and 
organizational type.    
The remaining content of the chapter is structured around three of the most 
fundamental debates in microfinance.  Not only have these questions shaped the course of 
microfinance to date, but they are still unresolved and will likely direct the future of the 
field.  The first topic concerns the critical features of the microfinance model.  For decades, 
practitioners and researchers have grappled with understanding exactly what makes 
microcredit appear to work (e.g. Stiglitz, 1990; Attanasio, Augsburg, De Haas, Fitzsimons & 
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Harmgart, 2012).  Some institutions are shifting their focus beyond credit, to include such 
products as microsavings and microinsurance (e.g. Dupas & Robinson, 2011; Karlan, Osei-
Akoto, Osei, & Udry, 2011).  The second topic addresses the appropriate role of 
commercialization in microfinance.  This issue has become increasingly polarized as 
organizations have begun accessing capital through public stock markets and sometimes 
generating substantial profits for shareholders (CGAP, 2007).  Whether commercial funding 
represents a much needed capital source or a move in the wrong social direction may be the 
most contested issue in microfinance (see e.g. Yunus, 2011).  The third topic concerns the 
actual impact of microfinance.  The recent publication of several randomized controlled 
trials suggests that the impact of credit on microenterprise growth is more modest than 
originally hoped (Bauchet et al, 2011; Banerjee et al, 2015).  However, the upside of such 
studies is that microfinance programs often produce other unintended benefits for the 
poor, such as risk reduction and better cash flow management (Morduch, 2011).  These 
findings are useful in that they suggest how microfinance might be reconceptualized to 
improve its social impact.  The chapter concludes with implications for the broader field of 
social finance based on lessons learned from the microfinance movement to date.    
2. Microfinance Terminology  
A basic definition of microfinance is "financial services for poor and low-income clients" 
(Gonzalez & Rosenberg, 2006, p.1).  While this definition offers a good starting point, it is 
helpful to further clarify what is typically associated with the term 'microfinance'.  Broadly, 
the idea and practice of financial services for the poor is not new.  For example, informal 
savings and credit associations for impoverished communities have existed for centuries in 
many countries around the world (Helms, 2006).  However, when the term 'microfinance' is 
used today, there is a general understanding in the industry that one is referring more 
narrowly to the movement that has taken shape over the last four decades built around a 
more specific financial model.  It is common for this movement to be referred to as "modern 
microfinance" (Trezza, 2006, p.20) or the "new microfinance" (Robinson, 2001, p.224).  In 
this chapter, usage of the term 'microfinance' will refer to this more narrow conception.       
What are the primary features of the modern microfinance movement?  The Grameen 
Bank, pioneered by Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh during the 1970s, is often cited as the 
prototypical example of modern microfinance (Morduch, 1999).  There are two key tenets 
to this type of model: (1) financial self-sustainability of the service provider and (2) targeting 
clients that are typically excluded from the formal financial market.  While not all 
microfinance institutions achieve financial self-sustainability, the intent is generally to 
charge interest rates and fees that allow the provider to cover its operational costs.  This can 
be contrasted with the model of many state-owned development banks from the 1950s to 
the 1980s that where built on the idea that credit to rural farmers had to be subsidized 
(Robinson, 2001).  The second tenet of modern microfinance is social inclusion often with 
the ultimate aim of poverty alleviation.  This is borne out by typically targeting clients in 
developing countries that are frequently excluded, such as women and the poor (Yunus, 
2003).     
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A further aspect of terminology that is useful to clarify is the distinction between 
microfinance and microcredit.  Microfinance is a more general term that refers to a variety 
of financial services; microcredit is a subset of microfinance that specifically refers to the 
provision of small loans.  In addition to loans, microfinance can also include financial 
services such as deposits, insurance, payment services, and money transfers (Daley-Harris & 
Awimbo, 2011).  Historically, the focus of microfinance has been on providing microcredit 
via group loans.  As a result, the majority of microfinance research to date has explored the 
features and effects of providing such loans.  However, over the last decade there has been 
a substantial shift in attempting to provide a more complete set of services beyond 
microcredit (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010).   
3. Historical Predecessors of Modern Microfinance 
The idea of financial services for clients excluded from the formal market has a 
substantial history.  In development finance, it has been a perennial question as to why 
certain populations seem to be cut off from the global credit market (see e.g. Braverman & 
Gausch, 1986; Stiglitz, 1990).  In response to this question, several reasons have been 
suggested as to why providing loans in developing economies is difficult.  Given the small 
loan amounts and high transaction costs, an institution needs to be highly efficient and 
maintain low default rates if it is to be financially sustainable.  While this challenge is not 
insurmountable, a lender typically faces the additional difficulties of: scarce information on 
potential clients before issuing the loan; limited ability to effectively enforce the loan once it 
has been disbursed; and, a lack of collateral to rely on if the client goes into default (Besley 
& Coate, 1995).  Taken together, these challenges create a daunting environment for an 
institution to be financially sustainable.  Faced with such circumstances, what financial 
models have been used in the past? 
Two types of predecessors are particularly important for understanding the current 
movement:  community associations and state-owned development banks.  Community 
associations, in particular Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (Roscas) and Credit 
Cooperatives, have been in use for centuries and are relevant for their use of group lending.  
These models are thought to have played a role in inspiring Yunus' ideas for the solidarity 
groups of Grameen Bank (Morduch, 1999).  State-owned development banks are relevant 
for their use of subsidized lending.  They are of interest predominantly because their failed 
attempts from the 1950s to the 1980s provided such a strong impetus for the new 
microfinance model (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010).   
Community Associations 
The roots of group lending can be traced to a type of community association known as 
the Rosca (Geertz, 1962; Besley, Coate & Loury, 1993).  Ardner defines a Rosca as an 
informal association "formed upon a core of participants who agree to make regular 
contributions to a fund which is given, in whole or in part, to each contributor in rotation" 
(1964, p.201).  Roscas serve the function of allowing members to pool their money into 
lump sums without the involvement of formal institutions.  If a member receives the lump 
sum earlier in the rotation, it can be viewed as that member having received a loan from the 
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group.  If a member receives the lump sum later in the rotation, the Rosca has functioned 
more as a savings device for the member.  This basic arrangement is used extensively 
around the world with a high degree of similarity (Geertz, 1962). 1  Since the 19th century, 
Roscas have been documented under different names; for example, in China they have been 
referred to as hui hui, in Nigeria as esusu, and in Scotland as menages (Ardner, 1964).  There 
is written evidence of Roscas being used in Japan as far back as 1275 (ibid).   
An important feature of Roscas is that the members typically know each other socially.  
They rarely start with a formal management or organizational structure, yet they typically 
have very high repayment rates.  Many researchers have asked how the repayment rates 
are maintained.  Roscas seem to avoid default problems by relying on the social 
cohesiveness of the group (Geertz, 1962; Ardner 1964; Besley et al, 1993).  Not only can 
members provide positive support and solidarity, there can be significant social cost in 
terms of pressure, embarrassment, or exclusion.  Such social mechanisms are key features 
of the modern microfinance model involving group loans.   
A more formalized community organization for financial access is the Credit Cooperative.  
In contrast to Roscas, these cooperatives often have a formal charter and some legal status 
(Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010).  Loans also tend to be larger and are paid back over longer 
periods.  In the cooperative model, the members are all shareholders, but not all the 
members are expected to take out loans.  The concept of community lending is still central 
to the model as members have a say in setting the terms of credit access and an ongoing 
interest in ensuring that the loans are repaid.  Cooperatives emerged in Germany during the 
late 19th century and are now seen internationally in countries as diverse as Ireland, France, 
Kenya, Malawi, and India (Huppi & Feder, 1990).   
State-Owned Development Banks 
While community associations are historically relevant for their often successful use of 
local cohesiveness, state-owned development banks are relevant for demonstrating the 
limitations of subsidized credit programs.  From the 1950s to the 1980s, there was a focus 
on development via government-mediated subsidies for the rural poor (Armendáriz & 
Morduch, 2010).  Using external funding and formalized organizational structures, 
development banks hoped to scale up financial services to the poor.  Subsidized credit for 
farmers was the most common approach.  Despite positive intentions, the results of such 
programs were broadly deemed a failure (ibid).  See the following vignette on India's 
Integrated Rural Development Program for a detailed example.   
The programs often failed to achieve their development goals and resulted in very high 
default rates.  Most government-subsidized credit programs in Africa, the Middle East, Latin 
America, and South Asia produced default rates between 40-95% during this period 
(Braverman and Guasch, 1986).  Failure of these programs is often attributed to an inability 
to enforce the loans, corruption within the institutions, and the diversion of funds to better-
off clients (ibid).  The experience of state-owned development banks led many to question 
whether such programs were a viable approach for extending financial access to the poor.   
                                                     
1
There are notable variations on the basic model including organizer fees, group size, fund amount, frequency 
of repayment, determination of payout order, etc.   
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4. The Modern Microfinance Movement   
Following in the wake of the disappointing subsidized credit programs, the greatest 
accomplishment of modern microfinance has been the demonstration that poor clients can 
be reliable bank customers (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, & Morduch, 2009).  The rapid spread of 
the microfinance model has been described by some as a financial 'revolution' (Robinson, 
2001).  What is different about the modern microfinance movement and where did this 
innovative model come from? 
Accounts of the pioneering microcredit institutions suggest that the model originated 
from real world experimentation in low-income countries like Bangladesh, Indonesia, and 
Bolivia (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010).  Credit is often given to Muhammad Yunus for 
developing the prototypical design of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh during the 1970s.  In 
his own words, Yunus was not attempting to fix the financial market, but rather to address a 
social problem: "I had no intention of lending money to anyone; all I really wanted was to 
solve an immediate problem.... the problem of poverty which humiliates and denigrates 
everything that a human being stands for" (Yunus, 1998, p.12).  The late 1970s was an 
experimental phase for Yunus and his colleagues: "We did not know anything about how to 
run a bank for the poor, so we had to learn from scratch.  In January 1977, when we started, 
Vignette: India's Integrated Rural Development Program 
India's Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) during the 1980s is an 
example of an ineffective attempt at development by means of government-
subsidized credit.  Approximately $6 billion USD in subsidies was directed to 
the rural poor throughout the decade (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010).  The 
government's intentions were decidedly focused on social impact for farmers: 
"The imperative laid down for the plan for rural areas of the country is 
increasing productivity through a strategy of growth with social justice... More 
specifically, it involves a sharp focus on target groups comprising small and 
marginal farmers, agricultural labourers and rural artisans..." (Rath, 1985, 
p.238).   
Given the amount of money invested, the results were startlingly unimpressive. 
Why did the IRDP fail to achieve its goals?  Critics often blame the 
performance of IRDP on several factors: endemic corruption, lack of 
infrastructure, and poor administration (Dreze, 1990).  Others more generally 
disagree with subsidized credit programs, arguing that they are not 
sustainable and disrupt the financial market.  The impact on poverty 
alleviation was a disappointment and default rates were over 40%.  "More 
than any positive historical precedent, it is the repudiation of these negative 
legacies that has driven the microfinance movement to look to the private 
sector for inspiration" (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010, p.11-12). 
  Microfinance: A Field in Flux 
7 
 
I looked at how others ran their loan operations, and I learned from their mistakes" (ibid, 
p.104).   
Since the beginning, Yunus focused his lending scheme on female borrowers.  He was 
particularly driven by their unjustified exclusion from the banking sector.  Yunus began by 
providing small loans to groups of women.  He thought that the group feature made the 
loans easier to keep track of for the bank.  Furthermore, groups could provide positive 
support and social pressure to smooth out behaviour patterns.  In terms of collection, he 
also experimented with very small and frequent repayment amounts, believing that lump 
sum repayments cause psychological hurdles for the borrowers.  For a 365 taka loan 
(approximately $15 USD) he would require the borrower to simply pay back one taka every 
day (Yunus, 1998).  Building on these principles of female inclusion, group lending, and small 
frequent payments, Grameen was formalized as an independent bank in 1983.   
Around the same time, institutions in other countries were pioneering similar 
approaches for providing microcredit.  In Indonesia, the microbanking division of Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) underwent substantial reform in 1983.  Aided by the government's 
major financial deregulation package, BRI was able to produce a large-scale commercially-
sustainable microfinance system with unusual speed and success.  By the end of the 1980s, 
both the Grameen Bank and BRI had demonstrated that microfinance institutions could 
reach over 1 million borrowers and maintain high repayment rates (Robinson, 2001).   In 
Bolivia, BancoSol was established in 1992 to provide microfinance on a national scale 
(Rhyne, 2001).  A substantial portion of BancoSol's funding was from international 
investment firms, further sparking global interest.  There were differences in approaches 
taken by such pioneering organizations, but the common thread was an interest in 
developing financial methods to reach the poor without subsidy.  Organizations were 
designing new financial products based on group and individual loans, reassessing 
appropriate interest rates to cover operational costs, developing new management and 
information systems, and rethinking appropriate training and incentives for staff members.  
By the late 1990s, microfinance had transitioned from a collection of institutions to a rapidly 
growing industry (Robinson, 2001). 
Accurately quantifying the growth of microfinance is a challenging task as many of the 
institutions are small and informal.  However, several research organizations have made 
estimates of microfinance at the global scale.  The largest primary-source collection of 
microfinance data has been produced by the Microcredit Summit Campaign (MSC).  Figure 1 
provides the number of registered microfinance programs and their clients according to the 
MSC (Maes & Reed, 2012).2 
                                                     
2
 For alternative market estimates see CGAP (www.cgap.org) or Microfinance Information Exchange 
(www.mixmarket.org).  Also note that the Microcredit Summit data includes growth based on existing 
programs registering for the first time, so may inflate year over year growth.  For further detail on the 
Microcredit Summit data see: www.microcreditsummit.org.   
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Figure 1: Growth of Microfinance Programs and Clients 
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Data Source: State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2012 
In 2010, the number of microfinance programs registering with the MSC was 3,652.  
These programs reported reaching a worldwide total of 205.3 million clients with a current 
loan.  During the period from 1997 to 2010, the number of total microfinance clients 
reported to the MSC grew on average by 23% per year.  A more conservative estimate of 
microfinance growth over the period from 1998 to 2004 was produced by the Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) by accounting for pre-existing institutions that start 
reporting to the MSC for the first time.  This approach resulted in a growth estimate of 12% 
per year (Gonzalez & Rosenberg, 2006).   
5. The Current Microfinance Landscape 
Given the origins and growth of the field, what does the landscape of microfinance 
providers look like today?  The landscape is populated by a diverse set of institutions.  To 
name just a few dimensions, organizations vary considerably in terms of mission, targeted 
clients, product offering, and funding source.  As more varied actors continue to enter the 
microfinance space, what qualifies as a microfinance provider is becoming increasingly 
blurred (Helms, 2006).  In this section, an overview of the landscape of microfinance is 
provided by examining three basic dimensions: (1) geographic coverage, (2) institution size, 
and (3) institution type.   
Figure 2 summarizes the geographic coverage of microfinance based on the number of 
'poorest' families reached in 2010.  'Poorest' refers to those living on less than $1.25 USD a 
day adjusted for purchasing power parity (Maes & Reed, 2012).  The figure provides an 
estimate of percentage coverage for each geographic region by comparing the number of 
poorest families accessing microfinance to the total number of poorest families.  
Microfinance in Asia and the Pacific is the most extensive both in terms of the absolute 
number of clients and in terms of the percentage of the relevant population that has been 
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reached (68.8% coverage).3  Since the 1980s, as was described with Grameen Bank and BRI, 
many of the pioneering institutions of microfinance have been located in Asia.       
Figure 2: Geographic Coverage of Microfinance 
 
Source: The World Bank and State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2012 
A second key dimension of the microfinance landscape is the size of institutions.  
Currently, a small number of large organizations account for the majority of clients, 
producing a fairly concentrated market structure.  See Table 1 for a breakdown of the 
market structure based on MSC data.  Of the 3,652 microfinance organizations that 
registered with the MSC in 2010, the largest 21 organizations provided loans to over 75% of 
the total poorest clients worldwide.  In contrast, there were thousands of small 
organizations that each served fewer than 2,500 clients and accounted for only 1.1% of the 
global market.   
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 It is known that some clients have outstanding loans at multiple organizations.  This results in some amount 
of overestimation of the number of microfinance clients and the coverage percentage.  However, based on 
individual MFI data, it is currently not possible to accurately gauge the overlap of borrowers (Gonzalez, 2008).    
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Table 1: Microfinance Market Structure by Institution Size 
Institution Size - Type 
Number of  
Institutions 
Combined  
Number of Clients 
Percentage of 
Total Clients 
Networks 8 65,105,273 47.3% 
1 million or more 13 40,267,670 29.3% 
1000,000 - 999,999 64 17,095,196 12.4% 
10,000 - 99,999 361 10,877,810 7.9% 
2,500 - 9,999 558 2,731,044 2.0% 
Fewer than 2,500 2,648 1,470,448 1.1% 
Total 3,652 137,547,441 100.0% 
Note: Size refers to number of 'poorest clients' (below the $1.25 USD a day threshold) 
Source: State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2012 
Finally, what does the current landscape look like in terms of institution type?  The 
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) provides a public source of institution types.  Here 
the institutions are divided into five categories based on legal status:  
 Bank: a licensed financial intermediary regulated by a state banking supervisory 
agency  
 Cooperative - Credit Union: a non-profit, member-based financial intermediary  
 Non-Bank Financial Institution: this category is often created specifically for 
microfinance composed of financial intermediaries that provide similar services 
to those of a bank, but may have lower capital requirements or restricted service 
offerings  
 Non-Government Organization: an organization registered as a non-profit, 
typically not regulated by a banking supervisory agency 
 Other 
Figure 3 provides the market structure in terms of the legal status of microfinance 
institutions in 2011.  NGOs are the most common institution type although they are 
comparatively small, accounting for 23.6% of borrowers.  Historically, NGOs accounted for a 
larger share of the microfinance market.  Currently, the increasing commercialization of the 
field is expanding the presence of banks and non-bank financial institutions.  It can be 
argued that these different institution types are serving different segments of the 
microfinance market.  An analysis by Cull et al (2009) found that NGOs typically have a 
stronger focus on social objectives.  NGOs tended to provide the smallest loans, target the 
greatest number of women, and reach the poorest clients.  The arguments for and against 
commercial funding are discussed in greater depth later in this chapter.   
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Figure 3: Microfinance Market Structure by Institution Type 
 
Note: Number of borrowers in millions 
Data Source: MIX Market 20114 
6. Critical Features of Microfinance 
So far in this chapter, an overview of microfinance terminology, historical growth, and 
current landscape has been provided.  With that background, the focus now shifts to three 
central debates in microfinance.  Focusing on unresolved debates is useful for 
understanding a field currently in flux.  The topics highlight alternative views regarding what 
has worked to date and potential future directions for microfinance. 
The first debated topic concerns the critical features of microfinance.  Given the 
historical emphasis on credit programs, much of the research to date has focused on loan 
features.  Microfinance pioneers often innovated along multiple dimensions simultaneously.  
This produces a situation in which it is difficult to disentangle the factors that may have 
been the most effective in prior programs.  Understanding the underlying mechanisms is 
particularly important when attempting to replicate the model in different cultural contexts.  
It remains an open question as to which features of microcredit are necessary, as well as 
how additional services and products should be incorporated in the microfinance offering.  
Here the debates around five features of microfinance are summarized: (1) group versus 
individual lending, (2) necessity of public repayment, (3) optimal repayment frequency, (4) 
impact of dynamic incentives, and (5) breadth of product-service offering beyond credit.   
                                                     
4
 The allocation is based on 896 institutions reporting to the MIX Market in 2011.  The criteria used to define 
what qualifies as a microfinance provider can produce different characterizations of market structure.  For an 
alternative view, see Helms (2006). 
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Group versus Individual Lending 
One of the most discussed features of microfinance is the use of joint-liability group 
lending.5  Instead of offering loans to individual clients, microfinance institutions often offer 
loans to groups of clients, such that if a borrower defaults, the other group members are 
held financially responsible.  Organizations have used a variety of group sizes and structures.  
On one end of the spectrum, BancoSol provides loans to 'solidarity groups' as small as three 
borrowers.  At the other extreme, 'village banking' models are based on groups of up to 50 
borrowers.  Such village banking models were pioneered by the Foundation for International 
Community Assistance (FINCA).  The Grameen Bank began with a nested structure between 
these two extremes: subgroups of five borrowers were linked as 40-person groups.  
Why are group loans particularly relevant to the poor?  The basic motivation is that 
financial institutions often lack information on potential clients, are unable to effectively 
enforce the loan, and have little collateral to seize if a borrower defaults.  These problems 
often make traditional lending in such markets financially unsustainable.  Group lending 
seems to overcome some of these challenges by leveraging the social relationships of the 
group.  Researchers have suggested that group members are in a better position to screen, 
monitor, and enforce on each other (Ghatak, 1999; Stiglitz, 1990; Besley & Coate, 1995).   
However, group lending has also been argued as placing too great a burden on 
borrowers.  One issue is that group lending transfers more of the risk from the bank to the 
group members, even though the bank is often in a better position to bear the cost of a 
defaulting client (Stiglitz, 1990).  A second concern is that group lending can produce 
substantial social costs for the borrowers as well.  One can easily imagine how positive 
support to repay could turn into a harmful form of group pressure (Woolcock, 1999; Brett, 
2006).  Moreover, survey research indicates that when the question is posed to clients as to 
whether they would prefer a group loan or an individual loan, most respondents favor not 
being held jointly liable (Murray & Lynch, 2003; Ditcher & Harper, 2007).   
Do the benefits of group lending outweigh the additional costs for the borrowers?  A 
first step towards answering that question is understanding the impact of liability type on 
repayment rates.  If the institution's operational benefits from group lending are small, a 
strong case can be made that the social costs of group lending outweigh the marginal 
economic benefits.  Studies that directly address this issue are limited to date, but are 
beginning to gauge the effect of liability type on repayment.  Giné and Karlan (2014) 
conducted two experiments in the Philippines regarding individual versus group liability.  In 
the first experiment, existing clients of a rural bank were assigned either to continue on with 
joint-liability contracts or to switch to individual-liability contracts.  In the second 
experiment, villages were randomly assigned to individual or group contracts from the 
outset.  In both experiments, the researchers found no significant difference in repayment 
rates between the individual and group contracts. 
An experiment by Attanasio, Augsburg, De Haas, Fitzsimons, & Harmgart (2012) in 
Mongolia also found no difference in repayment rates, although other positive effects of 
group lending were noted.  In their study, different villages were randomly assigned to 
                                                     
5
 In this document, group lending refers specifically to the use of a joint liability contract.  Other social aspects 
of microcredit, such as public repayment, are discussed in later sections.   
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receive access to group loans, individual loans, or no access.  While they did not find a 
difference in default rates based on contract type, they did find that group lending produced 
an additional positive impact for the borrowers in terms of business creation and poverty 
alleviation.  Attanasio et al argue that group lending ensures greater discipline in borrower 
behavior, notably better project selection and long-term execution.  A recent study 
conducted in Sierra Leone by Sabin and Reed-Tsochas (2014) found that variation in a 
microcredit group’s social structure has a significant effect on its economic performance.  
The study shows that group features, such as average spatial density and fragmentation, 
help us to understand why groups behave differently in terms of repayment.   
To date, it is still unclear how crucial group lending is to microfinance.  However, a 
general trend in the field is a shift away from joint-liability contracts.  Armendáriz & 
Morduch (2000) suggest that while group lending may be relevant in some situations, it is 
time to focus on other mechanisms that may be more important to microfinance and less 
socially costly.    
Public Repayment 
One such alternative mechanism for microcredit is public repayments.  Repayment in 
front of fellow community members leverages a social incentive without the full joint-
liability contract.  Research has found that the borrower's motivation to avoid 
embarrassment and social stigma can improve repayment rates (Rahman, 1999).  
Furthermore, public meetings can offer additional opportunities for training borrowers.  
Often viewed as an innovator in the field, Grameen Bank revised its group lending approach 
in 2001.  As part of the approach, Grameen no longer requires joint-liability loans but still 
administers loan collection in large public groups (Yunus, 2003).  The importance of public 
repayment is also well illustrated by the practical example of recent innovations in mobile 
phone banking.  See the M-Pesa and Group Lending vignette for a more detailed account.     
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Repayment Frequency 
Another questioned aspect of microfinance is the appropriate frequency of loan 
repayment.  The basic tension arises because more frequent repayments typically reduce 
delinquency but are more operationally costly.  If payments are not frequent enough, 
borrowers are faced with the challenges of repaying a larger lump sum.  Repaying a lump 
sum is difficult for practical reasons, e.g. borrowers often do not have savings accounts, as 
well as for psychological reasons, e.g. there is greater temptation to prematurely spend the 
money on consumption needs (Fischer & Ghatak, 2011).  Furthermore, Rai and Sjostrom 
(2004) argue that frequent payments produce more opportunities to gain information on 
the status of borrowers' projects.  This offers the lender greater insight into whether a 
defaulting borrower is truly unable to pay or is simply unwilling to pay.  Analyzing empirical 
data, Silwal (2003) found that greater frequency of repayment (weekly versus monthly) is 
correlated with lower delinquency rates.    
However, if payments are scheduled too frequently an unnecessary cost is placed both 
on the lender and the borrower in terms of time and resources.  Grameen Bank initially 
Vignette: M-Pesa and Group Lending 
In 2007, Safaricom-Vodafone launched a new mobile banking platform in 
Kenya called M-Pesa.  The platform allowed clients to transfer money via their 
mobile phones.  Within four years, M-Pesa had been adopted by over 14 
million customers and over 70% of households in Kenya (Suria, Jack, & Stokera, 
2012).   
M-Pesa actually started as a pilot program in 2005 to facilitate the loan 
disbursements and repayments of a microfinance institution called Faulu 
Kenya (Kumar, McKay, & Rotman, 2010).  During the 6 month pilot, Faulu 
realized that if borrowers could make their payments using their mobile 
phones, public meetings to collect payments were not necessary.  However, the 
management and staff at Faulu were concerned that without these public 
meetings, group cohesion - a key component of their lending model - would 
deteriorate.  Following the pilot, Faulu decided not to use M-Pesa for loan 
repayments.   
Other MFIs have come up with a hybrid approach that integrates M -Pesa with 
public meetings.  The Small and Micro Enterprise Programme pioneered an 
approach in which borrowers can make their payments via M-Pesa before 
group meetings, but attendance at the meetings is still required (ibid).  This 
results in less meeting time spent on cash collection and leaves more time for 
discussion of business problems and financial education.  Such an approach 
integrates the latest banking technology with the well-known benefits of 
public meetings for group cohesion.   
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experimented with daily payments, expecting these to be the easiest for borrowers to 
make.  However, Yunus found that daily payment was logistically burdensome and 
eventually switched to weekly payment (Yunus, 1998).  Lenders worldwide are still 
experimenting with credit products to achieve the right level of repayment frequency for 
their specific cultural context and the needs of their borrowers.  
Dynamic Incentives 
Another feature that is often attributed to the success of microcredit is the use of 
'dynamic incentives' or 'progressive lending' (Hulme & Mosley, 1996).  This practice refers to 
a lender offering a progression of increasing loan amounts to the borrower.  For example a 
progression of four six-month loans might proceed in the amounts of $100, $125, $150, and 
$200.  With dynamic incentives, relatively quick access to a greater amount of capital can 
serve as a strong incentive to pay back the current loan (Tedeschi, 2006).   
Programs based on dynamics incentives make it clear to the clients from the outset that 
the way they perform on their current loan directly affects the amount they can qualify for 
on the next loan.  In the case of default, access to all future loans is typically cut off.  This 
method has been used by microcredit providers of both individual and group loans.  In 
group loan situations, if one member defaults and the other group members are not willing 
to repay, typically all the members lose access to future loans.  Morduch (1999) notes that 
dynamic incentives may not produce an effective repayment mechanism if borrowers have 
easy access to loans from other organizations.  For example, if a borrower can default on a 
loan and subsequently receive a loan from a different organization that does not know his 
or her repayment history, there is less incentive to repay the current loan.  This suggests 
that without credit bureaus that can link repayment history across multiple lenders, the 
impact of dynamic incentives will decrease as the microfinance industry matures.   An 
increase in the saturation of microcredit providers will make it easier for borrowers to 
strategically default and take another loan elsewhere.   
Breadth of Product-Service Offering 
So far in this section the debated features of microfinance have focused on microcredit.  
This is reflective of the industry’s historical focus on credit.  However, during the 1990s a 
shift in terminology began in which 'microfinance' replaced 'microcredit' as the standard 
industry descriptor (Helms, 2006).  This shift was spurred on by an understanding that the 
poor needed access to a fuller set of financial products.  See Figure 4 for an overview of 
additional microfinance products.  Though most microfinance providers are still credit-
focused, today we see a greater number of providers offering a combination of credit, 
savings, insurance, money transfers, and 'plus' services.  Pro Mujer based in Latin America, 
offers a clear example of the 'microfinance plus' model.  In addition to providing 
microcredit, Pro Mujer offers business training and healthcare support for women. 
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Figure 4: Need for Broader Range of Microfinance Products and Services 
 
Source: CGAP 2006 
Why has attention only recently broadened to a fuller set of financial products for the poor?  
In the case of microsavings, proponents have argued for its relevance for decades, referring 
to it as the forgotten half of rural finance (Vogel, 1984; Gonzalez-Vega, 1994).  Microsavings 
can serve the dual purpose of providing the financial institution with an additional source of 
capital and offering clients a product that is critically needed.   Resistance to offering savings 
is often driven by the perceived difficulty of administering small deposit accounts in 
developing countries.  Financial institutions often expect that such accounts would be 
unprofitable (Robinson, 2001).  While there has been a realization that there is significant 
demand for complementary products such as savings and insurance, as of yet there have 
been no breakthrough innovations on the supply side of these products in the same way 
that the industry experienced breakthroughs regarding the implementation of the 
microcredit model (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010).  This may currently be changing as 
practitioners experiment with new banking platforms, such as mobile money (Scharwatt et 
al, 2015).  Further discussion of microfinance programs with extended offerings is included 
in the Impact of Microfinance section.      
7. The Commercialization of Microfinance 
The second core debate concerns the appropriate role of commercialization in 
microfinance.  It is useful to clarify at the outset what is typically meant by 
'commercialization' in this discussion.  As most microfinance providers use market-based 
principles to reach their objectives, the polarizing issue is not so much an issue of 
organizational design, but rather the use of commercial capital, i.e. funding with a profit 
motive (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010).  Opponents of commercialization argue that 
expectations of generating profits for investors will necessarily result in mission drift and 
ultimately harm the poor (see e.g. Bateman, 2010; Yunus, 2011).  In contrast, proponents of 
commercial funding view it as a positive and much-needed source of capital, not 
incompatible with the social focus of microfinance.  They argue that earning profits will 
attract more capital to the industry and enable institutions to better meet the global 
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demand for microfinance (see e.g. Akula, 2010; Rangan, Chu, & Petkoski, 2011).  Armendáriz 
and Morduch (2010, p.10) describe that "[i]f there is one unresolved tension that animates 
those who spend their days working on microfinance, it entails how to navigate the trade-
offs between maximizing social impact and building strong, large financial institutions.  It is a 
healthy tension, but an inescapable one."   
In 2004, C.K. Prahalad's conception of 'The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid' 
brought further attention to the idea that profits could be made while alleviating global 
poverty.  The microfinance industry has leveraged commercial funding through debt for a 
considerable time.  Much more recently, the industry has begun to be seen as an 
appropriate place for equity investments, private and public.  Several microfinance 
institutions have made initial public offerings (IPOs) on stock exchanges: Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (2003), Equity Bank in Kenya (2006), Banco Compartamos in Mexico (2007), and 
Swayam Krishi Sangam (SKS) in India (2010).  The two latter IPOs, both approximately 13 
times oversubscribed (CGAP 2007; MicroCapital, 2010), generated a significant amount of 
public controversy with critics claiming the organizations were unnecessarily profiting from 
the poor.  These IPOs have received the bulk of attention, both positive and negative; 
however, significant equity investments in microfinance have also been made through 
private placements (Glisovic, González, Saltuk, & de Mariz, 2012).  Table 2 summarizes the 
recent growth of private equity transactions both in number and value.  Those in support of 
increased commercial interest in microfinance see these trends as a natural progression.  
Michael Chu, former president of Accion, argues that worldwide demand for microfinance 
cannot be met unless profit-oriented capital is drawn in.  Increased competition should 
eventually bring interest rates and profits down to consumer-friendly levels (Rosenberg, 
2008).  
Table 2: Historical Private Equity Transactions in Microfinance 
     
Note: CGAP-JPMorgan estimates that this sample covers 70-80% of microfinance PE activity 
Data Source: CGAP Research, Global Microfinance Equity Survey 2012 
  
Year
Transactions 
(number)
Value
 ($US million)
2005 28 106
2006 37 20
2007 37 60
2008 63 144
2009 32 230
2010 37 205
2011 68 292
Total 302 1057
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What is the argument against the commercialization of microfinance?  Muhammad 
Yunus offers one of the clearest views as to why increased commercialization is the wrong 
direction for microfinance.  He argues that expectations attached to commercial funding 
cause microfinance providers to act as a new "breed of loan sharks" (Yunus, 2011, p.A23).  It 
is argued that commercially funded institutions will need to raise interest rates and engage 
in aggressive loan collection to satisfy profit-oriented shareholders.  The demands of ever-
increasing profits will cause a shift in the mission of microfinance that ultimately defeats the 
purpose of improving the lives of the poor.  For those sharing Yunus' views, the IPO of Banco 
Compartamos was a striking example of his concerns.  Leading up to the IPO, Compartamos 
was charging an average annual interest rate of approximately 100% to its clients (CGAP, 
2007).  During the IPO, the owners of Compartamos sold 30% of their stock for a total of 
$458 million USD.  Critics claim that such interest rates and profits cannot be morally 
justified.  Yunus argues that an additional downside of such transactions is that they further 
burden the poor with financial risk.  Instead of creating funds based primarily on local 
deposits, organizations pursuing IPOs are accessing capital from volatile global markets and 
then transmitting this volatility to poor borrowers who are ill-equipped to mitigate the risk 
(Yunus, 2011).   
A middle-ground view on the commercialization debate starts with the perspective that 
commercial funding will inevitably increase.  The primary concern then becomes how it can 
best be integrated into the industry.  There have been multiple occurences of commercial 
funding causing microfinance markets to overheat.  For example, in Bolivia during the 
1990s, there was an influx of commercial funding and the market became so oversaturated 
that default rates soared and the market nearly collapsed (Rhyne, 2001).  In more recent 
years, the microfinance market in India has struggled with instability.  See the vignette on 
'The Crisis in Andhra Pradesh' for more details.  However, some empirical analysis has 
suggested that high growth of microfinance insitutions is not inherently detrimental to 
portfolio quality, except in the most extreme situations (Gonzalez, 2010).  Portfolio 
deterioration can be mitigated if providers focus on growing expansively instead of locally.  
By looking to less developed geographic markets, the risk of creating a locally saturated 
market can be reduced.    
Another reason why commercial and non-profit funding may constructively coexist in 
the industry is that these sources of funding tend to focus on different social objectives and 
market niches.  Commercial microfinance banks are more likely to involve individual lending, 
make larger loans, and target fewer of the neediest clients (Cull et al, 2009).  
Nongovernmental microfinance organizations are more likely to involve group lending, 
make smaller loans, and actively target more of the neediest clients (ibid).  Furthermore, 
even though the microfinance industry is populated by a diversity of institutions of different 
sizes and types as described in a previous section of this chapter, commercial funding raised 
through IPOs and private equity investments to date has concentrated on the larger, more 
established microfinance institutions (Glisovic et al, 2012).  This suggests that while multiple 
sources of funding are entering the microfinance industry, they are often directed towards 
organizations with different and potentially complementary objectives.   
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8. The Impact of Microfinance 
The third debate concerns the actual impact of microfinance.  In recent years, there has 
been increased attention placed on moving beyond the promise of microfinance towards 
rigorously assessing its effects.  In general, research studies and the experience of 
practitioners suggest that microfinance can make a positive impact on its clients, but recent 
randomized trials suggest that the magnitude of the impact is often modest and the manner 
in which it benefits the poor is often not as originally anticipated.   
Before examining the studies, given the strong growth and high repayment rates of 
microcredit, why is impact assessment a critical concern?  First, the magnitude of the impact 
Vignette: The Crisis in Andhra Pradesh 
The state of Andhra Pradesh in India is an example of a microfinance market to 
recently struggle with oversaturation.  The Indian market had been one of the 
strongest areas of microfinance growth over the preceding five years, 
accounting for over 65% of client growth worldwide (Maes & Reed, 2012).  
Andhra Pradesh was home to four of the largest Microfinance Institutions 
(MFIs) in India and many state-supported self-help groups (SHGs) providing 
similar microfinance services.  Combined, the MFIs and SHGs were reaching 
over 23 million clients in Andhra Pradesh as of 2010.  In July of that year, the 
explosive growth of the market was exemplified by the initial public offering 
(IPO) of India's largest MFI, SKS Microfinance.  The IPO rasied over $155  
million USD and made substantial profits for its shareholders.  
However, Andhra Pradesh was headed for crisis.  Microfinance clients in the 
area were highly over-indebted, with upwards of 80% of clients responsible for 
loans from multiple MFIs.  Most of the MFIs did not have guidelines in place to 
gauge a client's level of indebtedness.  The breaking point of the crisis 
occurred in late 2010 when allegations were reported of suicides resulting 
from the coercive collection practices of MFIs.  This ignited a politic al debate 
in which some political figures urged MFI clients not to repay their existing 
loans.  The loan recovery rate dropped below 10%.  Many MFIs were unable to 
continue their operations and the microfinance sector in Andhra Pradesh was 
almost wiped out.    
Some describe the crisis in Andhra Pradesh as a primarily political issue.  
Others see it as a case of overaggressive growth fueled by the interests of 
commercial profits.  Following the crisis, legislators in India have been working 
on passing regulation aimed at stabilizing the market and preventing such 
occurrences in the future.  (This vignette draws primarily on material provided 
in CGAP, 2010 and Maes & Reed, 2012) 
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is important because investing in microfinance draws on financial and human resources that 
could be invested in other poverty alleviation activities.  If the impact of microfinance is 
positive but weak, perhaps development-dedicated resources could make a stronger impact 
on poverty alleviation if they were invested elsewhere, for example towards large, labor 
intensive enterprises in developing countries (see Karnani, 2007).  Second, understanding 
impact is increasingly important as a broader range of investors with mixed performance 
objectives enter the microfinance space.  The philanthropic Rockefeller Foundation in 
conjunction with J.P. Morgan have set an agenda focused on 'Impact Investing' (O’Donohoe 
et al, 2010).  See the vignette 'Rockefeller Foundation and J.P. Morgan: Impact Investing 
Initiative' for more details.  Such investors are often interested in measuring impact using 
both social and financial performance indicators.  Third, impact assessments will play a 
critical role in influencing the future of microfinance.  Careful impact studies can provide 
insight into how the services need to evolve to better meet the needs of clients and the 
goals of the institutions.    
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Challenges of Impact Assessment 
The fundamental question driving microfinance impact assessments is typically some 
variant of “How are the lives of the participants different relative to how they would have 
been had the program not been implemented” (Karlan and Goldberg, 2011, p.17)?  
However, reaching an informative answer to this question is challenging for several reasons.  
First, accurately gauging how the lives of clients might have changed even if they were not 
involved in microfinance can be difficult.  During a study period, clients not involved in 
microfinance may also experience some improvement in their financial situation due to 
other factors, for example the macroeconomic environment in the country may have 
improved or there may have been increased investment in community infrastructure.  In 
order to accurately determine what amount of impact should be attributed to involvement 
in microfinance versus other such factors, it is necessary to have a valid measurement of the 
Vignette: Rockefeller Foundation & J.P. Morgan - Impact Investing Initiative 
'Impact Investing' captures the idea that investors can pursue financial returns 
while simultaneously addressing social and environmental problems (Bugg-
Levine & Emerson, 2011).  Investing for non-financial returns has a substantial 
history; however, an initiative was recently launched by the Rockefeller 
Foundation and J.P. Morgan aimed at defining and unifying this space.  A 
report by the Monitor Institute on social and environmental investing found 
that the state of the market was fragmented, lacked widely accepted impact 
metrics, and had few platforms for intermediation (Freireich & Fulton, 2009).  
To begin addressing such challenges, the Rockefeller Foundation and J.P. 
Morgan produced 'Impact Investments: An Emerging Asset Class' (O’Donohoe 
et al, 2010), in which they attempted to clarify and size the potential market.  
They estimated that the market offered the potential over the following ten 
years for invested capital of $ 400 billion to $1 trillion USD.   
How will the increasing momentum behind impact investing affect the 
microfinance field?  Though not restricted to developing countries, impact 
investing targets the 'base of the pyramid' as defined by the World Resources 
Institute as people earning less than $3,000 USD a year.  The 2010 Impact 
Investments report (ibid) identified microfinance as one of the key sectors in 
which the initiative is to be targeted.  Impact investors come in a variety of 
types, ranging from private foundations such as the Esmée Fairbairn 
Foundation, to large-scale financial institutions such as Citigroup. There is 
significant variation in the return expectations of such impact investors, with 
financial aims ranging from competitive to concessionary.  This points to the 
importance of effectively matching the interests of investors to the social-
financial mission of microfinance institutions.  As the infrastructure for impact 
investing continues to develop, the interests of investors will fuel the demand 
for additional performance measures of microfinance institutions.  
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counterfactual, i.e. how lives would have been had the program not been implemented 
(Karlan and Goldberg, 2011).  Gauging the counterfactual is usually accomplished by 
comparing the change experienced by those involved in microfinance to the change 
experienced by those not involved.   
This comparison raises a second basic challenge of microfinance impact studies: 
selection bias.  Often the individuals that want to be involved in microfinance programs 
differ systematically from those that do not choose to become involved.  For example, those 
that choose to get involved in microfinance may already have stronger businesses and feel 
more confident that they will be able to repay a loan (Hashemi, 1997).  A simple comparison 
of microfinance participants to non-participants may significantly overinflate the effect of 
microfinance involvement by not accounting for this selection bias.   
A third assessment challenge particularly relevant to microfinance is the necessity to 
account for individuals that drop out of the programs (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010).  For 
example, under group lending contracts a borrower is often removed from the group for 
poor performance.  In such a case, microfinance may have had a negative effect on that 
particular client's life, but he or she often drops out of the assessment which leads to an 
overestimate of impact.   
Finally, defining the measures of impact is a challenging task because effects of 
microfinance may reach into many dimensions of a client's life.  The most common 
measures of microfinance impact are related to enterprise income and household 
consumption (Karlan & Goldberg, 2011).  However, there is wider interest in other social 
impact measures as well, such as consumption smoothing, healthcare, education, and 
female empowerment (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010).  Understanding the interaction of 
these different measures is important because they can often be interrelated, e.g. an 
increase in one measure causes a drop in another (Karlan & Goldberg, 2011).   
The challenges of assessment mentioned here are not minor concerns.  If such issues are 
not appropriately addressed, they can affect the results of impact measurements by up to 
100% or even reverse conclusions (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). 
Results of Randomized Controlled Trials  
To overcome the challenges of impact measurement, there has been increased attention 
in microfinance placed on the use of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) (Bauchet et al, 
2011).  An RCT mitigates many of the challenges listed above by comparing the effects of a 
treatment group (e.g. those that receive access to microfinance services) to a control group 
(e.g. those not offered access to microfinance).  By drawing on a large enough sample and 
randomly determining the groups that are designated as treatment and control, the groups 
serving as a control population are expected to have on average the same basic 
characteristics of the treatment population and provide a clean estimate of the 
counterfactual (Karlan & Goldberg, 2011).  While the RCT method poses several benefits for 
research, it is useful to keep in mind that it can raise important ethical issues by selectively 
offering access to some potential clients and not others, who may be equally in need. 
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Several RCT studies on the effects of access to microcredit have been conducted over 
the last decade in different cultural contexts.  Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan 
(2010) studied the effect of offering access to microcredit in randomly selected slums in 
Hyderabad, India.   Crépon, Devoto, Duflo, and Parienté (2011) conducted a similar study 
providing access to selected rural villages in Morocco.  Augsburg, De Haas, Harmgart, and 
Meghir (2015) randomized loan access to marginal applicants at the individual level in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In 2015, these studies, along with three additional RCTs from 
Ethiopia, Mexico, and Mongolia, were formally published and compared in a volume of the 
American Economic Journal (Banerjee, Karlan & Zinman, 2015). In what ways did these 
studies find similar or differing results?   
It is striking that the findings from these RCTs, despite their different contexts, are 
predominantly consistent.  They found on average "modestly positive, but not 
transformative, effects" for those given increased access to microcredit (Banerjee et al, 
2015, p.1).  These studies consider various categories of outcome measures.  As a first step, 
does increased microcredit access actually result in more potential microentrepreneurs 
taking out loans?  The take-up rates across these studies fall in a range from roughly 17%  in 
Morrocco (Crépon et al, 2011) to 31% in Ethiopia (Tarozzi, Desai & Johnson, 2015).  These  
take-up rates can be interpretted in two very different ways depending on one's 
expectations.  On the one hand, this is a relatively high rate of the relevant population 
interested in seeking a business loan.  On the other hand, if one expects microcredit access 
to serve as a cure-all for poverty, it is directly affecting a relatively small percentage of the 
target population.    
A second impact question is does microcredit access enhance business activity, as 
measured by increases in assets, investments, or profits?  The majority of studies found 
positive and economically significant average impacts on business activity, however there is 
interesting variation (Banerjee et al, 2015).  For example, the study in Mongolia (Attanasio 
et al, 2015) found that the creation of new businesses increased significantly, but only for 
those clients involved in group loans (a 10% increase over controls).  However, there was no 
significant change for those reciepients of individual loans.   
Do the average increases in business activity actually translate into downstream 
improvement in household income and living standards?  The potentially surprising result is 
that the studies did not find consistently strong effects on these household outcomes.  
However, though the average level of these outcomes did not change significantly, there 
was a difference in their compositions.  For example, there was a shift in the composition of 
household income resulting from a reduction in wage income offset by an increase in 
business income (Banerjee et al, 2015).  In this sense, while microcredit access may not be 
directly transformative in terms of poverty reduction, "it does afford people more freedom 
in their choices (e.g., of occupation) and the possibility of being more self-reliant" (ibid, 
p.12).  Likewise, the studies did not find an overall increase in living standards as proxied by 
household consumption.  However, there was some evidence for a change in the 
composition of expenditures.  Most notably, they found decreased spending on 
discretionary goods, such as temptation goods and entertainment.  Such behavioral shifts 
may have more substantial  effects downstream.   
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An important caveat of these microcredit RCTs is that they are limited in their ability to 
gauge long-term impact.  The experiment durations in these studies ranged from 14 months 
(Augsburg et al, 2015) to 24 months (Crépon et al, 2011).  While these studies generally did 
not find signficant effects on social indicators, some outcomes may take longer to 
materialize, such as education and health impacts.      
Such findings on microcredit impact over the last decade have elicited mixed responses.  
For critics of microcredit, the findings suggest that it is failing to meet its lofty expectations.  
Accordingly, one should consider funneling more resources into alternative approaches for 
poverty alleviation.  In contrast, the strong proponents of microcredit suggest that excessive 
weight should not be placed on such a small number of relatively short-term studies.   
A different view of loan access considers that though microcredit may not be 
revolutionizing microbusinesses as expected, it is positively impacting poor households in a 
variety of unanticipated ways (Morduch, 2011).  There is a growing body of evidence, 
drawing both on formal evaluation studies and other forms of descriptive research (e.g. 
Collins et al, 2009), that suggests the real impact of microfinance is not its effect on 
microbusinesses, but rather on managing tight cashflows in poor households.  The studies 
suggest that microcredit is more often used to cope with financial risk (e.g. pay for funeral 
expenses), to make household investments, or to pay for food, medical bills, and school fees 
(Morduch, 2011; Bauchet et al, 2011; Karlan & Zinman, 2011).  Microcredit recipients are 
adapting the product to suit their own needs.  Often long-term business growth is not the 
most pressing issue.   
Such evidence lends further credence to the idea that the basic microfinance model 
should move beyond credit to involve a broader range of products.  Though the findings are 
still preliminary, new impact evaluations focusing on other microfinance products, such as 
savings and insurance, have found stronger effects on the lives of clients (Bauchet et al, 
2011).  A study by Dupas and Robinson (2011) on microsavings in Kenya found that there 
was strong demand and usage of savings accounts.  Women that recieved access to a 
savings account increased their business investment, had more money available to purchase 
food for their households, and were better able to deal with health shocks as compared to 
those in the control groups.   
An evaluation of microinsurance for farmers in Ghana also found positive effects on 
household welfare, with members of the households that received access less likely to go 
without meals (Karlan, Osei-Akoto, Osei & Udry, 2011).  These studies suggest that though 
the rhetoric of microfinance has almost exclusively focused on the mechanism of 
microenterprise growth, there are substantial opportunities for improving welfare through 
products focused on cashflow management and risk mitigation (Bauchet et al, 2011).  
A similar approach is based on the idea that offering additional individual financial 
services is not enough; rather, a more holistic set of products and services need to be 
offered simulataneously.  One example is the Graduation program designed and originally 
implemented by BRAC (Banerjee et al, 2015).  The program provides six complementary 
services: productive asset transfer (e.g. livestock or microbusiness inventory); consumption 
support in cash or food (to reduce incentives to liquidate the productive asset for 
immediate consumption); technical skill training on managing the chosen asset; high 
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frequency home visits and coaching to encourage productive use of the asset; access to a 
savings account; and health education, such as nutrition and hygeine training.  The 
motivation of this approach is to provide a "big push" that may be necesssary to help the 
extreme poor break out of a poverty trap (ibid, p.773).   
RCT studies have been conducted on this multifaceted approach and the results are 
promising (Banerjee et al, 2015).  Findings from six different countries indicated that the 
Graduation program produced consistently positive impacts along multiple dimensions: 
income, food security, living standards, and mental health.  The studies found that the 
effects persisted even after the program had ended (results three years after initial asset 
transfer and one year after the end of household visits).  The researchers note that while 
this approach is more expensive than some alternative efforts at poverty alleviation, they 
suggest that the program benefits are sustainable and cost effective (ibid).      
9. Implications for Social Finance 
Over the last four decades, the pioneers of modern microfinance have wrestled with 
developing an effective means for extending financial access to the poor.  The evolution 
from a handful of organizations to a worldwide industry has been shaped both by innovative 
advances as well as some unfortunate missteps.  What implications can be drawn from the 
experience of microfinance for social finance more broadly?  Three implications present 
themselves based on the content reviewed in this chapter.     
First, the history of microfinance suggests that the details of the financial model and 
product features are not minor concerns, but are at the core of the movement's success.  
Microcredit did not dramatically expand over the last several decades simply because there 
was demand for credit access and an available supply of capital.  The generally unsuccessful 
attempts of government-subsidized credit programs for the rural poor from the 1950s to the 
1980s demonstrated that good intentions and available funding are not enough.  Rather, a 
key differentiator of modern microfinance was the early demonstration of a model for 
credit that was financially sustainable and scalable (Cull et al, 2009).  Seemingly subtle 
innovations such as group lending, frequent repayment, and dynamic incentives were at the 
heart of the new movement.  For the broader field of social finance, this suggests that the 
details of the financial products and services will play a central role in determining success 
or failure.  As illustrated by the growing interest in impact investing, it is likely that the 
available capital for social investment will continue to increase dramatically over the next 
decade (O’Donohoe et al, 2010).  The challenge lies in developing innovative products and 
delivery systems uniquely suited to their objectives, rather than relying on loose-fit 
adaptations of preexisting models.   
Second, several missteps of the microfinance movement offer a cautionary word against 
extreme growth fueled by commercial funding.  In various markets, such as Bolivia during 
the 1990s and India during the late 2000s, institutions leveraging commercial funding 
contributed to the markets' dramatic increases in scale.  However, these markets also 
became so quickly saturated that they reached crisis points and nearly collapsed (Rhyne, 
2001; CGAP, 2010).  Social finance is particularly at risk of excessive growth because it often 
targets markets that are urgently in need of social change.  Often these markets are less 
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developed and lack significant infrastructure to mitigate system-wide risk.  In the example of 
microfinance, Bolivia and India lacked independent credit bureaus for tracking a client's 
individual level of indebtedness across institutions.  In such markets, it is easier for 
unrestrained growth to result in collapses that ultimately harm the intended beneficiaries of 
social finance.   
Third, as the public awareness of microfinance has grown, impact assessment has played 
different roles.  Early on, the story and promise of microfinance played a primary role in 
building global awareness.  Once the microfinance model gained international attention, 
controlled studies have played an increasingly important role.  Furthermore, the case of 
microfinance suggests that quality evaluation studies can do more than gauge impact.  
Rather, evaluation studies can also be effectively used to shed light on the specific 
deficiencies of a program and how they should be revised.  For microfinance, a combination 
of practitioner experience, qualitative research, and evaluation studies has reinforced the 
idea that the basic microcredit product for enterprise growth has not been meeting the 
most pressing financial needs of the poor (Morduch, 2011).  Clients were using products in 
unanticipated ways to suit their own needs for cash flow management and risk reduction, 
suggesting that further advances in microsavings and microinsurance are needed.  For social 
finance more broadly, this indicates that there may be substantial benefits in viewing impact 
studies as more than straight-forward assessments of program success or failure.  A 
nuanced understanding of why a program does not work as expected can in itself reveal 
alternative paths forward.   
10. Conclusion 
This review of the development and current state of microfinance illustrates the rapid 
change occurring in the industry.  The field is in flux along several dimensions.  Access to 
new commercial sources of funding is shifting the market structure.  The landscape of 
microfinance institutions is becoming increasingly diverse in terms of organizational design 
and mission.  Some microfinance markets have overheated in recent years, highlighting the 
risk of markets becoming oversaturated.  Rigorous impact assessments are raising new 
questions about what microfinance can actually achieve.  This is causing many to rethink 
how the standard microfinance product-service offering should evolve to better suit the 
financial needs of the poor.    
Muhammad Yunus goes so far as to say that some of the new commercial institutions 
entering the industry should not be allowed to leverage the term 'microcredit' with their 
business models (Yunus, 2011).  He argues that the term has been built up over the 
preceding decades to connote a certain level of commitment to social objectives, a way of 
dealing with the poor based on trust and respect, and that the term can now be easily used 
to misrepresent an organization's business activities.  Whether one endorses or eschews 
Yunus’ view, it is true that microfinance is increasingly a diverse space and distinguishing 
organizational objectives is not obvious.  This tension exemplifies the flux occurring in the 
field and highlights the need for an awareness of the diversity of models that constitute 
modern microfinance. 
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